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RECENT CASES
ACTION-CONDITION PRECEDENT-TENDERING RETURN OF COLLATERAL
SECURITY.-REUSENS v. AiRKENBURGI1. i19 N. Y. SupP. 821-Held, that it
is not incumbent on plaintiff, in an action at law on an obligation to pay
money, or for moneys loaned or expended at defendant's request, to
tender the return of collateral security.
It is well settled that possession is of the essence of a pledge. Casey v.
Cavaroc, g6 U. S. 467. If a pledgee, after receiving possession of the
chattels pledged, permits the pledgor to resume possession of them, he
loses his right to their possession. Thompson v. Dolliver, 132 Mass. io3.
And the pledgor has no right of possession in the property pledged until
he has extinguished the debt or made sufficient tender of payment. Rear-
don v. Patterson, 19 Mont. 231. It is also established that a person hold-
ing collateral securities is under no obligation to resort to them before
suing on.the principal claim. Ambler v. Ames, I App. Cas. (D. C.) i9i.
In view of these decisions, since tender has been aptly defined as the offer
to perform an act which the offeror is bound to perform (Bouv. Inst., Sect.
2437. quoted in McLain v. Batton, 5o W. Va. 121, 130), the holder of col-
lateral security need not tender back the same before proceeding against
the principal debtor. Trotter v. Crockett, 2 Port. (Ala.) 401. Similarly it
has been held that a tender of stock held as collateral security was not a
condition precedent to maintaining an action on the original debt. Taylor
v. Chrever, 6 Gray (Mass.) 146.
BANKS AND BANKING-BANK OFFICERS-ILLEGALLY RECEIVING DE-
POSITS.-PARRISH V. CoMMONIwEALTH, 123 S. W. 339 (Ky.).-Held, that the
term "insolvency" as used in the Ky. St., Sec. 497, providing that, if any
president of a bank shall receive or assent to the'receiving of deposits
with the knowledge that the bank is insolvent, he shall be guilty of a
felony, means that all of the bank's property and assets are not sufficient
to satisfy its debts, and not that it may not have sufficient funds in its
vaults to satisfy all its depositoris, or any considerable number of them,
on the same day or in case of a run. lobson and Barker, J.J., dissenting.
"Insolvency" has been differently defined by different courts, and it
may le said to have two distinct and well defined significations. In its
restricted meaning, the term denotes the inability to meet liabilities as
they become due in the ordinary course of business. Chipiman v. Mc-
Clellan. 159 Mass. 363, 368. As applied to banks, "insolvency," by the
weight of authority, is used in its restricted meaning, or, in other words, a
bank, by the weight of authority, is insolvent when it cannot pay its de-
posits on demand. according to its promise. Atater v. American Exch.
Bank. 152 Ill. 6o5. Thus. contrary to the holding of the case at hand,
under Comp. Laws, Sect. 685o, punishing the receipt of a deposit by a bank
officer when the bank is insolvent, and the officer knows of such insolvency,
the term "insolvent" means a present inability to pay depositors as banks
usually do, and meet all liabilities as they become due in the ordinary
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course of business. State v. Ste-Vens, i6 S. D. 309. When the alleged in-
solvent is not a trader or a merchant, the term "insolvency" is ordinarily
held to have a less restricted meaning than when applied to bankers,
traders, etc., Williamson v. Hatch, 55 Minn. 344, or, in other words, "in-
solvency" as popularly understood, denotes the state of one whose assets
are insufficient to pay his debts. Van Riper v. Poppenhasusen, 43 N. Y. 68.
This less restricted meaning has sometimes been applied to banks, and in
State v. Myers. 54 Kan. 2o6, it was held, that in determining the question




ATL. 172 (PA.).-Held, that a broker is not entitled to commissions on 
a
sale by his principal, notwithstanding he is given the exclusive right to sell,
unless it is also agreed that he shall receive a commission, whether the
sale be effected by him, by the principal, or some other person.
The mere fact that a broker is constituted an exclusive agent to sell,
does not prohibit the owner himself from effecting a sale, and in such 
a
case the principal is not liable for commissions. Dole v. Sherwood, 
41
Minn. 535. However, under similar facts the Supreme Court of Texas
has held that such agents are entitled to a reasonable compensation. 
Har-
rell s,. Zimpleman & Bergen, 66 Tex. 292. In Levy v. Rothe, 17 Misc. 402
(N. Y.), where brokers are given the "option and exclusive agency 
to
sell," the court, construing the word option as "right." distinguishes be-
tween a mere exclusive agency and the exclusive right, and holds 
the
principal precluded from effecting a sale except at the risk of paying 
com-
missions if the agents produce a purchaser within the time limited. 
And
in most jurisdictions the rule seems to he. that brokers having the exclu-
sive agency for a certain period are entitled to a commission if they 
pro-
duce, within that time. a purchaser ready and willing to buy on the 
terms
stipulated. Waterman '. Boltinghouse, 82 Cal. 659; Moses v. Burling, 
31
N. Y. 462.
CORPORATIONS - GENERAL MANAGER - IMPLiED AUTHORITY.- 
STUDE-
BAKER BROS. Co. v. R. M. RosE Co., 119 N. Y. SUPP. 97o.-Held, that 
the
words "general manager" simply import that he is a general executive 
offi-
cer for all the ordinary business of the corporation, and no inference can
be indulged in that he possessed authority to make a contract for the pur-
chase of an automobile binding on the corporation.
The implied powers of a general manager t6-day are generally under-
stood to be co-extensive with the general scope of the business. Thomp.
Comm. Corp., Sect. 8556. His implied authority has been held to extend
to the purchase of advertisements and catalogues for an academy, in
Georgia Military Academy v. Estill, 77 Ga. 4o9, and to the purchase of
signs for similar purposes, in B. S. Greene Co. v. Blodgett, 55 Ill. App.
566. However, his authority does not extend to any matters or transac-
tions which are not properly incident to the management of the ordinary
business. First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Ashville Furn. & Lbr. Co.,
i16 N. C. 827. So he is not authorized to go beyond its usual manner of
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transacting its business by hiring a horse and buggy for its employees,
where such hiring was not necessary to the transaction of its business.
Baird Lumber Co. v. Devlln, 124 Ala. 245. Finally, a general manager has
no implied authority to make contracts for his personal benefit. Marshalt
on Corps., Sect. 361.
CRIMINAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-MISTRIAL.-STATE 1. KINGHORN,
1o5 PAC. 234 (WAssH.).-A jury was impaneled and sworn, and the state
had commenced the examination of prosecutrix, when accused moved to
dismiss because he had not been arraigned, and had not pleaded to the
information. The motion was denied, whereupon accused was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty. The jury was then discharged over ac-
cused's objection, and a new jury impaneled and sworn, and he was con-
victed, notwithstanding the plea of former jeopardy. Held, that jeopardy
had attached, and that accused was entitled to dismissal Fullerton, J.,
dissenting.
As to the period when jeopardy begins the decisions are not alto-
gether in harmony, but by the decided weight of authority it is held that
jeopardy attaches when a person is placed upon trial before a court of
competent jursidiction, under an information or indictment sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged
with his deliverance, i. e., impaneled and sworn. In re McClasky, 2 Old.
568; State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 556; Cooley's Const. Lint. (2nd ed.) 325-
Contra, People v. Goodwin, 18 John. 187; U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Summ. 6o.
Under such circumstances the accused cannot again be subjected for the
same offense, unless the jury is discharged from rendering a verdict by a
legal necessity or by his consent. People v. Horn, 7o Cal. 17. In the case
of State v. Bronkol, 5 N. D. 507, where the jury was impaneled and
sworn before defendant had been arraigned or had pleaded to the infor-
mation, it was held that a discharge of the jury was a legal necessity and
hence jeopardy did not attach. And it is well settled that defendant is not
put in jeopardy where a jury which was impaneled before his plea, is dis-
charged and a new jury is impaneled and sworn to try the case. United
States v. Riley, 5 Blatchf. 204; see also Minor v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky.
Law Rep. 176.
CRImINAL LAw-EvIDENCE-MOTIVE.-PEOPLE V. MORSE, 89 N. E. 816
(N'. Y.).-Where the defendant after committing a highway robbery,
shot and killed a policeman in his attempt to escape arrest, the court held,
that evidence of the robbery though not competent to prove another crime,
was competent as part of a continuous transaction to show defendant's
motive and intent in shooting the policeman.
It is a fundamental rule of evidence that on a prosecution for a par-
ticular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that
accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which
he is on trial, is irrelevant and inadmissible. People v. Carpenter, 136
Cal 391. However, in an early decision in this country, it has been held
that evidence of another independent crime is admissible where it appears
to be connected as part of one entire transaction. Heath v. Common-
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wealth, I Robinson (Va.) 735. So in the later cases, as in Commonwealth
v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, this principle seems to be approved and it is
there held that evidence of another crime is admissible to show motive
when the two crimes are parts of one plan, actuated by a common purpose
Under a California decision, evidence of a robbery was admissible when
the accused was on trial for the killing of an officer. People v. Pool, 27
Cal. 572; and usually where the acts are so connected that they might be
regarded as being the continuation of the same transaction, evidence is
admissible. State %'. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 197.
DEATH-PRESUMPTION OF SuVIvoaRSHiP.-Du N v. NEw AMSTERDAM
CASUALTY Co., 118 N. Y. SuPP. 491.-Held, that where insured and his
beneficiary, under a policy payable to the legal representatives of insured
on the beneficiary's prior death, both perished in the same disaster, no
presumption of the survivorship of either will be indulged, and the per-
sonal representatives of insured must establish her survivorship by proof
to recover on the policy.
Under the civil law, where two persons perished in the same disaster,
and there are no circumstances showing which survived, presumptions as
to survivorship arise from the probabilities resulting from strength, age,
and sex of parties. Succession of Langles, 105 La. 39. But the common
law indulges in no presumption of survivorship whatever may have been
the age, sex, or physical condition of persons. Paul v. Halick, 18 App. (D
C.) 9; U. S. Casualty Co.'v. Kracer, i6g Mo. 3o. It has been wrong-
ly held that where there is no way to determine which of sev-
eral parties died first, the rights of succession to their estates are
to be determined as if death occurred to each at the same time. In re
Wilbur, 2o R. I. 126. But the true rule is in accord with the principal
case, XIX., Yale Law Journal p. 375.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-PROMISE OF VENDOR OF CORPORATE STOCK TO RE-
PURCHASE.-ScHAEFFER V. STRIEDER, 89 N. E. 618 (MASS.)-Where the de-
fendant induced the plaintiff to purchase certain stock, the defendant agree-
ing to refund the purchaser's money at any time on thirty days' notice,
should he become dissatisfied, it was held, that such a contract was not a
contract for the sale of "goods, wares and merchandise," within the
statute of frauds.
It is generally held, as in the case under discussion, that where a pur-
chase is made of securities, a promise by the seller to return the money
:paid for them, if the purchaser becomes dissatisfied, is not.within the
statute of frauds. Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561. In Gwnvell v.
Morris, 2 Cal. App. 451., the same was held, that such a contract is not
within the statute, and the reason given for the holding being that the con-
sideration for the defendant's promise was not for the sale of the stock,
'but was for its purchase by the plaintiff which was executed, and the
transfer of the stock became a mere condition incidental to the defend-
ant's promise. A contract, however, between the parties to an executed
sale to resell the goods is within the statute. Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141;
Gorman v. Brossard, i2o Mich. 611. Also, an oral agreement by a third
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person to repurchase bonds if unsatisfactory to the vendee is within the
statute. Chamberlain v. Jones, 32 App. Div. N. Y. 237. And, when the
third person is the agent of the vendor, the same has been held. Morse v.
Douglass, 99 N. Y. S. 392.
INSURANCE-POLICY--CANCELLATION BY INSURER-RETURN OF UN-
EARNED PREMIUM.-TAYLOR V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, 105 PAC.
354 (OKL.).-Held, that the return of the unearned premium is essential
to a cancellation of a policy by an insurance company, where the policy
among other things provides, "Vhen this policy is cancelled by this com-
pany by giving notice, it shall retain only the pro rata premium." Dunn
and Hayes, J.J., dissenting.
If the policy gives the insurer the right at any time to cancel and re-
fturn the unearned premium, "upon surrender of the policy," ori the right
to cancel "upon notice," the return of the premium or tender thereof is
not a condition precedent to the cancellation of the policy. Phoenix
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Brecheisen, 50 Ohio St. 542; Arnfeld v.
Guardian Assurance Co., 172 Penn. St. 6o5; Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Sam-
inons, ii Ill. App. 230. If, however, the return of the unearned premium
is a condition for exercising the right of cancellation, a failure to return
or tender the premium renders the attempted cancellation nugatory.
Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Botto, 47 Il1. 516; White v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co.,
120 Mass. 330. In New York, under the "New York Standard policy,"
whose words regarding cancellation are similar to those used in the case
under discussion, a return or tender of the unearned premium is necessary
to the cancellation of the policy. The court, in coming to this conclusion
said, that although it is not within the language, it is implied. Tisdell v.
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 163. In Chrismnan & Sawyer
Banking Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 75 Mo. App. 310, the court came
to the same conclusion on the ground that a contract cannot be brought
to an end by one party except by placing the other party in statu quo.
Likewise, in Continental Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 15Ol, the
same was held, on the ground that the provision is somewhat ambiguous,
and should be construed most strongly against the insurer. The dissenting
opinion in the case at hand, is based on the ground that the court is really
making a contract for the parties. while a court's jurisdiction only goes as
far as the construction of a contract. [bid. Lewis v. Conmz'rs of Bourbon
Co., 12 Kan. 186.
INSURANCE - SUBROGATION - ACTIONS - PARTIES.- HANTON 'v. NEW
ORLEANS & C. R. LIGHT & POWER Co., 50 So. 544.-Held, that where the
owner of property which has been destroyed by fire through another's
negligence has been paid part of his losses by an insurer, who thereby be-
comes subrogated to the remedies of the assured, an action to recover
from the wrongdoer the value of the property destroyed is properly
brought in the name of the assured, and the insurer is not a necessary
party to such action.
It is well settled that if a loss by fire is not settled by a third person
legally bound for its satisfaction and the insurance company is compelled
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to pay the loss, it is entitled to equitable subrogation to the claim of the
insured against such third person. Hart v. Western R. Co., 13 Met. (Mass.)
99. But the insurance company can recover only to the extent to which
it has been compelled to reimburse the assured for his loss. Chicago R.
Co. v. Glenny, 175 Ill. 238. The insurance company which had paid only a
part of the loss cannot maintain an action against the third party, as this
would result in a splitting up of the cause of action. Mobile Ins. Co. v.
Columbia R. Co., 41 S. C. 408. But by statutory provisions it is usually
possible by joinder to maintain a single action by which the rights of all
shall be determined. Home Ins. Co. v. Oreg. R. Co., 20 Ore. 569. By
virtue of the subrogation, the company may use the name of the insured
without his consent. Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Hutchinsol, 21 N. J. Eq. 107.
But under statutory provisions allowing the real party in interest to sue,
the company may maintain the action in its own name. Hartford ns. Co.
v. Wabash R. Co., 74 Mo. App. io6.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LOCAL OPTION--"SPIR1TUOUS, VINOUS, OR
MALT LIQUORS.'-CITY OF BOWLING GREEN V. MCMULLEN, 122 S. W. 823
(K.).-The Kentucky statutes, i9o9, Sect. 2557, made it unlawful, after a
local option election resulting in the vote against the sale of "spirituous,
vinous, or malt liquors," to sell any such liquors. Held, that in view of
any prior judicial construction of the words in prior statutes on the sub-
ject, the statute is not violated by the sale of malt liquor containing less
than two per cent of alcohol, and not intoxicating in the largest quantity
in which it may be drunk. O'Rear, J., dissenting.
The weight of authority, contrary to the holding of the case at hand,
seems to be that if a statute specifically forbids the sale or unlicensed
sale of a certain liquor, as "malt liquor," the question of the intoxicating
properties of the liquor sold is immaterial. Evans v. State, 113 Ga. 749;
State v. O'Connell, 99 Me. 61; State v. York, 74 N. H. 125. Thus, in
Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 122 Pa. St. 2W, no issue was raised under
Act. Pa., 1887, prohibiting the sale of malt, brewed, vinous, or spirituous
liquors, as to whether the liquor sold was intoxicating. However, in the
construction of statutes the prime object is to ascertain and carry out the
purpose of the legislature in their enactment, and to do this the words
used in the instrument should be first considered in their .literal significa-
tion; but it is often necessary to inquire beyond such meaning of words.
Evansville v. Summers, io8 Ind. 192. Courts also in construing or inter-
preting a statute, give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at
the time of its enactment. Cont. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 556 (Mass.).
LICENSES-CONSTITUTIONALITY-EXEMPTION OF OCCUPATION.-STATE
EX REL. GREENWOOD v. RAMAGE, 123 N. W. 823 (MINN.).-Held, that a city
ordinance prohibiting peddling without a license, which exempts "vendors
of farm produce or green fruits and vegetables" is void.
It is well settled that the constitutional requirement of uniformity does
not necessarily prohibit a license tax on business or avocation. McGhee
V. State, 92 Ga. 21; Morril v. State, 38 Wis. 428. Yet such requirement is
violated by a license fee which does not fall alike on all persons engaged
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in the particular business or avocation taxed. Peoria v. Guggenheim, 61
Ill. App. 374; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145. But if all persons engaged
in a particular business are classified for taxation according to natural
and well recognized lines of distinction, then the constitutional requirement
of uniformity is not violated. Des Moines v. Bolton, 128 Ia. io8. And the
weight of authority is that a law imposing a license on peddlers dealing
in goods, wares and merchandise except agricultural products and other
specified goods is based on a classification conforming to natural and well
recognized lines of distinction. In re Watson, 17 S. D. 486. However,
it seems well settled in the state of the case at hand, that the legislature
cannot make a distinction between peddlers of their own produce and
other peddlers. State v. Wagener, 69 Minn. 2o6.
MANDAMUS-CORPORATE SToci-TRANSFER ON BOOKS.-PEOPLE EX REL.
ROTTENBERG V. UTAH GOLD & COPPER MINES Co., iig N. Y. SuPP. 852.
Held, that mandamus will not lie to compel a corporation to transfer
stock on its books; relator's title being perfect on delivery to him of the
certificate properly endorsed, the registration only further evidencing his
title and insuring payment of dividends, and the remedy at law by action
for damages being available.
In some jurisdictions mandamus has been held a proper remedy to
compel a corporation to transfer stock on its books. People.v. Crockett,
9 Cal.112. This has been for numerous reasons; because the secretary's
duty is ministerial, in In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401; as to railroad corporations,
because the public is interested therein, in State v. Railroad, 38 La. Ann.
312; and because the legal remedy was too doubtful in character, in State
v. Mclver, 2 Rich. N. S. (S. C.) 25. But mandamus generally does not
lie to enforce private rights. Asylum v. Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. 172. Nor
when there is an adequate remedy at law. State v. Housezworth, 63 Neb.
658. Accordingly, corporate officers cannot be so compelled to transfer
stock on its books, without proof that their refusal will cause pecuniary
injury unrecoverable at law. State ex rel. Mepham v. St. Louis Paint
Mfg. Co., 21 Mo. App. 521. And the probable weight of authority holds
that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus will not be granted to com-
pel the transfer of corporate stock, since the applicant has an adequate
remedy at law for damages. Shipley v. Mechanics Bank, ro Johns. (N. Y.)
484.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DEFECrIVE WALKS OR CROSSINGs-NoniCE
OF DEFECT.-MILLER V. VILLAGE OF MULLAN, 104 PAC. 66o (IDAHO).-The
municipal authorities cannot be held chargeable with notice of the time
when, and conditions under which, a wooden sidewalk will cease to be
safe for pedestrians, merely on account of age and consequent decay,
where there is no obvious or patent defect.
As a general rule the municipality is liable for injuries caused by de-
fects in the highway only if it had actuhl c,- constructive notice of such
defect a sufficient time before the accident, to show negligence on its part
in failing to repair it. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136
U. S. 45o; Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115 . But if the
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defective condition is due to the direct act of the municipality itself, or a
person whose acts are constructively its own, then no notice either actual
or constructive need be shown. Jones v. Deering, 94 Me. 165. And as
the duty of care and supervision of sidewalks imposed upon a municipality
by its charter, requires it to take notice of the natural tendency of wooden
sidewalks to decay, Furnell v. City of St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117, it was held
liable by some courts for injuries caused by wooden, walks which had be-
come defective on account of age and consequent decay. City of Indian-
apolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. x96; Denver v. Dean, 1o Col, 375. Constructive
notice of a defect in a sidewalk will'be presumed if it was such as to put
a reasonably prudent man, whose business it was to look after the repairs,
on inquiry to examine its condition, City of Joliet v. Walker, 7 Ill. App.
267, or if it was openly and notoriously defective, Lindholm v. City of
St. Paul, i9 Minn. 245. But if those constantly using a street failed to
notice the defect it may be presumed that the municipal authorities had
no notice of it. Broburg v. City of Des Moines, 63 Ia. 523. It may also
be added that the municipality is not an insurer or guarantor of the safety
of the highways, and consequently may not be liable for injuries even
though the person injured was in the exercise of due care. Wilson v.
Granby, 47 Conn. 59; Hunt v. New York, iog N. Y, 134. That by the
weight of authority cities are liable, even in absence of express statute to
that effect, for injuries resulting from defects in highways amounting to
negligence, while quasi-corporations, such as towns and counties are not,
see Smith's Cases on Municipal Corporations. p. iig note.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SEWER SYSTEM--NEGLIGENCE IN CON-
STRUCTION.-HART V. CITY oF NEILLSVILLE, 123 N. W, 125 (WIs.).-Where
a municipality puts a sewer system in operation, having first duly adopted
plans therefor, and the same is insufficient because of failure to exercise
ordinary care in executing such plans, held that it was liable for injuries
proximately caused to private property, without concurrence of contribu-
tary negligence of the owner thereof. Winslow and Dodge. J. J., dissent-
ing.
The general rule is in accord with the above case and holds that a
municipal corporation is liable for damages sustained by an individual
from want of proper care, skill, and diligence on the part of the cor-
poration in the construction of sewers. Woods v. City of Kansas, 58 Mo.
App. 272; Barton v. City of Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54. As the construction is
the exercise of a merely ministerial function it must be performed with
reasonable care and skill to avoid liability in case of injury. Langley v.
Augusta, 118 Ga. 59o; Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 La. 308. It is also the
duty of the municipality to keep the sewers in repair and for failure to
do so, causing damage, it is liable. City of Saiannah v. Spears, 66 Ga. 304.
But the municipality is not liable for an error of judgment on the part of
the authorities in locating or planning a sewer. Aicher v. Denver, io Col.
App. 413; Keely v. Portland, ioo Me. 26o. This rule, however, according
to a number of authorities does not extend to exempt a municipality from
liability for negligence in the adoption of a plan; so, where an obviously
defective plan is adopted, the municipality is liable for fhe resulting dam-
age. Dc Baker v. So. Cal. R. Co., io6 Cal. 257; Louisville v. Norris, ixn
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Ky. 9o3. Some courts hold that the adoption of such a plan is a judicial
act for which the municipal authorities are under no common law liability.
Darling v. City of Bangor, 68 Me. io8; Johnston v. Dist. of Col., 118
U. S. 9.
SALES-CONDITIONAL SALES-DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY-LIABILITY OF
PURCHASER.-NATIONAL CASH REGISTER CO. V. SOUTH BAY CLUB 
HOUSE
Ass'N., 118 N. Y. Supp. io44.-Held, that where the defendant gave a
note for the price of a cash register under a contract of conditional sale,
with reservation of title and before payments were made on the note, the
defendants' club house and the contents, including the register, were de-
stroyed by fire without defendant's fault, it is liable on the note.
The weight of authority is that where personal property is sold and
delivered to the vendee under an agreement that the title is to remain 
in
the vendor until payment, the loss or destruction of the property while in
the possession of the vendee before payment, without his fault, does not
relieve him from the obligatio*n to pay the price. Tufts v. Griffen, o7
N. C. 47. But, on the other hand, it has been held in a case where a note
was given with an agreement that title was to remain in the plaintiff
until the note was paid that when the property in the defendant's posses-
sion was destroyed without his fault the consideration for the note 
failed.
Arthur & Co. v. Blackman, 63 Fed. 536. A fortiori it is well settled that
where the property is lost through the negligence of the vendee he will 
be
liable. Neally v. Wilhelm, 4 G. Green (Ia.) 24o. But in the case of 
an
optional sale an accidental loss of property, before the option to purchase
is exercised, falls on the bailor. Strauss Saddlery Co. v. Kingman, 42 
Mo.
App. 208.
TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS. CONGREGATION
KEHAL ADAH JESHURUM M'YASSY v. UNIVERSAL B'LD'G. & CONSM Co., 
1i9
N. Y. SuPP. 72.-Where a religious corporation, owning 
property about to
be sold on the forclosure of a mortgage, held by a business corporation
composed wholly of members of the former, entered into an oral agree-
ment with the mortgagee in consideration of money paid on a prior 
un-
executed contract and the mortgagor's promise not to bid or procure 
bid-
ders, that the mortgagee should bid in the property for the 
mortgagor's
benefit and convey it to the mortgagor, it was held, that the mortgagee 
in
an action to enforce the agreement, should not take advantage of 
the
statute of frauds. Ingraham J., dissenting.
The statute of frauds, making an express trust created by parol in-
valid, has no application to cases where the law raises a constructive 
trust
by reason of fraudulent acts and purposes in procuring title to land. Cross-
man v. Keister, 23 Ill. 69. Thus, where the defendant orally agreed to act
as agent for the plaintiff to buy certain land in the plaintiff's name 
but
had the conveyance made out to himself, paid for it with his own money,
and denied the agency, it was held that the defendant was liable to the
plaintiff as trustee ex male fcio. Halsell v. Wise Country Coal Co., 19 
Tex.
Civil App. 564. But, there is much authority holding that the defendant
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is not liable on these facts, on the ground that the trust is created 
by the
agreement of agency, and so is within that section of the statute of frauds
requiring declarations of trust in lands to be in writing. Burden 
v. Sheri-
dan, 33 Iowa 425; Nestal v. Schmidt, 29 N. J. Eq. 458. The ruling of 
the
first case, that the trust is not within the statute, seems to be based 
on the
better reasoning, in that agency, though created by' an agreement, 
is
properly a relation, or status, which, for a particular purpose, is fiduciary,
and an abuse by the agent of this fiduciary relation is a fraud 
on his
principal, and renders him liable for the proceeds of
, his wrongful act as a
constructive trustee; and so this trust really results by operation of 
law.
and so is not within the statute of frauds. Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss. 494.
There is even greater reason, in the case under discussion, for the holding
that the trust is not within the statute, for, by means of the verbal agree-
ment, the purchaser was able to obtain the property at a price below 
its
value. Under practically the same facts the same was held in Ryan v. Dox,
34 N. Y. 307, and in McNeil v. Gates, 41 Ark. 264; and this 
seems to be
the weight of authority on the subject.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-PUBLIC WATER 
SUPPLY-WATER COM-
PANY-PAYMENT OF DiSPUTED BILL FOR WATER-
'
HATcH v. CoNsuMERs Co.
LTD., 104 PAc. 670 (IDAHO) .- Held, that a water company cannot enforce
a rule requiring a consumer to pay an old or disputed bill for water fur-
nished him at some previous time, or for some other and independent
use, or at some other place or residence, or for a separate and 
distinct
transaction from that for which he is claiming and demanding a 
water
supply, as a condition precedent to supplying him with water, where 
he
tenders payment of the established water rate in advance for the service
he is demanding.
It is well established that the rule allowing a water company to shut
off the water supply, for the non-payment of its bills refers 
to current
rents only, and not to rents for past service. Merrimac River Savings
Bank v. City of Lowell, 152 Mass. 556. And similarly, a quasi-public 
com-
pany cannot refuse to furnish gas to a consumer, where he tenders pay-
ment of the prescribed rate in advance, because he refuses to pay a former
gas bill, or a bill contracted for gas used on other premises. Gas 
Light
Co. of Baltimore v. Colliday, 25 Md. I; Lloyd v. Washington Gas Light
Co., I Mackay (D. C.) 331. But a water company may provide by its by-law
that if the rent is not paid, the supply shall be cut off until all arrears, 
and
expenses for shutting off, are paid. Brumm v. Pottsville Water 
Co., 9
Penn. 483. And the one desiring the supply turned on must pay 
the
arrears even though they were incurred by a former tenant. 
City of
Atlanta v. Burton, go Ga. 486; Girard Life Ins. Co. v. Phila. 88 Pa. St. 
393.
WITNESS-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.-
RIcHARDS v. RICHARDS, 119 N. Y. SuPp. 8i-Where a client gives 
his
attorney notice of his place of residence it was held, not to affect the 
at-
torney's professional employment, and is not a "privileged communica-
tion," which the attorney cannot be compelled to disclose for the purpose
of service of an order on such client,
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As a general rule every communication which a client makes to his
legal adviser for the purpose of professional advice or aid upon the sub-
jects of his rights or liabilities is to be deemed confidential and the dis-
closure thereof is forbidden. Vogel v. Gruaz, iio U. S. 311; Carter v.
West, 93 Ky. 2H. But it has been held in one jurisdiction that the at-
torney may disclose or be compelled to disclose the address of his client.
Alden v. Goddard, 73 Me. 345. For a communication by a client to his
attorney was held not to be privileged where it was not made for the pur-
pose of enabling him to give advice or to render professional services.
House v. House, 6i Mich. 69. Nor does the general rule apply to mere
abstract legal opinions on general questions of law, either civil or crim-
inal. McMannus v. State, 39 Tenn. 213. It is not necessary in order to
entitle the client to claim the privilege, that he enjoin secrecy upon the
9ttorney or even be aware of the existence of any privilege. McLellan v.
Longfellow, 32 Me. 494. The privilege is not confined to statements by
the client to the attorney, but applies with equal force to statements made
and advice given by the attorney to his client. Liggett v. Glenn, 4 U. S.
App. 438. And as the privilege is that of the client, it is within his power
to waive it whenever he sees fit to do so. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464!
